Is big data enough? A reflection on the changing role of mathematics in applications by Napoletani, Domenico et al.
Is big data enough? A reflection on the changing role of
mathematics in applications
Domenico Napoletani, Marco Panza, Daniele Struppa
To cite this version:
Domenico Napoletani, Marco Panza, Daniele Struppa. Is big data enough? A reflection on the
changing role of mathematics in applications. Notices of the American Mathematical Society,
American Mathematical Society, 2014, 61 (5), pp.485-490. <halshs-00984828>
HAL Id: halshs-00984828
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00984828
Submitted on 28 Apr 2014
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Is big data enough? A reflection on the changing
role of mathematics in applications
Domenico Napoletani ∗, Marco Panza †, and Daniele C. Struppa‡
The advent of computers, and especially high performance computers,
has had a dramatic impact on the way in which mathematics is done, and
even more on how mathematics is applied, as demonstrated by the growth of
computational mathematics as well as what goes under the name of “experi-
mental mathematics”, to which a journal is now devoted. More importantly,
computers are now used to perform highly complex computations in order
to apply mathematical models to a variety of empirical problems that could
never be attacked otherwise. It is in this way that mathematics is often now
applied in different branches of biology (think of genomics and proteomics)
as well as to social sciences, and in what now goes under the generic term
of “big data”.
High performance computing has also brought changes in the way we
think about mathematics, its power, its methods, and the way in which it
can be used to solve problems. For this reason, we would like to do something
unusual in a mathematical journal, by bringing the mathematical commu-
nity into one of the discussions that are taking place among philosophers
of mathematics and of science. While many mathematicians are weary of
asking broad methodological questions, because the danger of being vague
and unclear is all too real, we also think that we must have this discus-
sion concerning the modalities in which mathematics is applied, if we don’t
want to be trapped by our own assumptions, and miss out on more fruitful
approaches to understanding reality. This a discussion about the ways com-
putational mathematics has not only changed our approach to science, but
even our way to understand a phenomenon.
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We believe it is possible to identify four methodological motifs that are
closely related to each other and whose elucidation may make explicit the ap-
proach to problem solving in data analysis and statistical learning. By using
short and evocative labels, we could say that these motifs concern, respec-
tively, the microarray paradigm, the preeminence of historical phenomena,
the conceptualization of developmental processes, and the principle of forc-
ing, which we have introduced and partially expanded upon in [23, 24, 25],
also in response to some acute commentaries [14, 20]. Here we would like
to simply focus on their rationale and potential significance in clarifying the
underlying trends of quantitative, data-driven science.
The first methodological motif, the microarray paradigm, is derived by
considerations that have become quite important in modern molecular bi-
ology. As it is well known, DNA microarray technology (see for example
[2]) allows the scientist to capture and visually represent, on an extremely
large array of microscopic sites, information on the expression level of short
strands of messenger RNA (mRNA), extracted and amplified from a given
cell population. When the large amount of data derived from DNA mi-
croarrays is coupled with simple clustering techniques, it is often sufficient
not only to differentiate cell populations from distinct tumors, but also to
determine the outcome of a given therapy, without the need for an under-
standing, in each tumor population, of the actual role of each of the mRNA
strands whose expression level is quantified by the microarrays.
Thus in [23] we have spoken of the microarray paradigm to indicate how
much modern data analysis is supported by the belief that sufficiently large
data collected from a phenomenon will allow to answer any question about
the phenomenon itself, if treated with appropriate methods, and assisted
by powerful enough algorithms. Significant methods in statistical learning
theory that embody the microarray paradigm include the aforementioned
clustering techniques, in their more traditional hierarchical forms [31], but
especially in their more unstructured versions such as the affinity propa-
gation method recently introduced in [11], that exploits a completely local
passage of information among data points to obtain their fast and accu-
rate splitting into clusters, whose best representative, the ‘exemplar’ is also
identified. Boosting [10] is another striking technique, perhaps the most
transparent embodiment of the microarray paradigm, where a large number
of classifiers, slightly better than random guesses, are combined, boosted,
to build a new classifier that is much more accurate than its components
(cf. [13], chapter 10). Finally, we mention here the recent field of ‘nonlinear
manifold learning’, a collection of methods to find low dimensional objects,
preserving some type of local, neighborhood structure, in unstructured, high
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dimensional data (see [30, 28] and [15], chapter 16).
As we can see from these examples, within the microarray paradigm, an-
swers are found through a process of automatic fitting of the data to models
that do not carry any structural understanding beyond the actual solution
of the problem itself, a distinctive lack of knowledge which we wanted to
emphasize in [23] by speaking of “agnostic science”. The somewhat naive
belief in the assumptions of the microarray paradigm was popularized in a
recent cover article in Scientific American [32], where the author discusses
how the collection of unprecedented amount of data could allow the con-
struction of a computing model to predict the future, and even earlier in
the opinion piece of Chris Anderson in Wired magazine [1] that envisioned
a future of atheoretical, automatic science.
Our objective in [23] was less concerned in stating that such paradigm has
gained ground, or why this has happened, than in uncovering its structure,
and the assumptions it depends upon. Indeed physicists often work and
approach their science from a very different point of view. Regardless of how
complex nature may be, there is a belief that a fundamental explanation
can be found, and that a theoretical, explicative model can reached. So,
for example, Newtonian dynamics is considered a fundamentally successful
description of the universe, and an archetype of the way science should look
like, irrespective of the fact that, within its framework, a solution of a basic
question such as the three-body problem is, effectively, not computable. And
yet these shortcomings have not led physicists to abandoning Newtonian
dynamics: within non-relativistic velocities, and as long as the bodies we
study are not too small, Newtonian mechanics is still (rightly) considered
a perfectly good model of reality, indeed one of the most successful and
enduring.
If it is not the lack of computability (as in the three-body problem) or
the lack of precision (as it happens for the relativistic effects that Newto-
nian dynamics fails to account for or predict), then what does require the
agnostic approach embodied in the microarray paradigm? We suggest that
such an approach is required when the phenomena we want to deal with
are historical in a sense that needs some explanation: at least in an intu-
itive sense, we call ‘historical’ those phenomena whose development can only
be constrained locally (in time and/or space) by (potentially multiple) opti-
mization processes acting on subsets of variables, and in such a way that the
functions to be optimized change over long periods of time. It appears that
many of the sciences, which have been less receptive to the classical process
of mathematization, concern this sort of phenomena. Biology, economics,
the social sciences in general, all are examples of disciplines that study phe-
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nomena whose development seems to be historical in the sense we suggested
above. Our second broad methodological motif is thus the preeminence of
historical phenomena in contemporary science.
Fitness landscapes, introduced by Sewall Wright in [34], best exemplify
and motivate the definition of historical phenomena: the evolution along
such landscapes is partially shaped by local optimization constraints but,
crucially, these constraints change dramatically their nature over time, so
that such evolution is not likely to be fully described by any single global
optimization process. The selective pressure, due to varying environmental
conditions, on the genotypes of a given population is an example where a
local search for an optimal phenotype is subject to constantly varying con-
straints. Recalling that alternate versions of a same gene are called ‘alleles’,
the basic idea of fitness landscapes is to represent a population as a point in
a high dimensional space determined by its average allele frequencies, and
to represent the average fitness of the population by the value of a corre-
sponding function; the graph of the function generates a multidimensional
surface (which is just the fitness landscape) and the potential evolution of
the population is described by the local maximization of the fitness on the
graph. Note that the landscape itself will slowly change when the evolution
of several competing populations (not necessarily from the same species) is
considered at once, since the fitness of one of them will affect the environ-
ment of the other (see [12] for a recent overview of these issues).
Coming back to the general definition of historical phenomena, we can
assume that the time scale at which there is a switching from one local
optimization process to another in the development of such phenomena, is
much longer than the time scale of the optimization processes themselves.
Again, fitness landscapes could provide a motivation for this assumption,
since the environmental conditions, and the shape of the landscape, change
slowly with respect to the change of the position of the individual genotype
points ([12], page 1613). Note also that not all variables are likely to be
subject to selective local optimization at the same time.
Now it is possible, indeed it happens often, that specific questions about
an historical phenomenon can be reduced to simple models, that require
knowledge of only a few key measured quantities. But the models derived
to answer each individual question are not only usually data-driven, but
often unable to answer other relevant questions on the same phenomenon.
And the methods exemplifying the microarray paradigm we mentioned ear-
lier certainly lead to temporary models that have this characteristic. This
inability to gain a global understanding is not surprising, if we think about
the randomness and relative independence of the selective optimization pro-
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cesses that shapes individual characteristics of the current state of an his-
torical phenomenon.
It may be that a full, structured understanding that potentially leads to
answers for a wide enough class of questions about a typical historical phe-
nomenon would require knowledge of its entire history, or the development
of a proxy, a data-driven model that is likely as complex, and opaque, as
the phenomenon itself, a perspective reminiscent of incompressibility ideas
in Kolmogorov complexity [21], but in the context of a whole set of suit-
able potential questions. The methodological danger is that the flood of
data generated by our innumerable measuring devices may convince us that
data is enough, that there is nothing beyond the microarray paradigm, and
that opaque, enormous, data-driven models are the privileged way to ap-
proach phenomena, even though they become so similar to the famous map
of Borges [4], that was useless, since it was as big as the geography it was
supposed to describe.
So the problem arises of how we can gain meaningful understanding of
historical phenomena, given the tremendous potential variability of their de-
velopmental processes. Indeed, several techniques in mathematical modeling
already show the usefulness of a partial historical modeling of key variables,
evolving in time, describing a phenomenon, we think here of nonlinear time
series analysis methods [17], where modeling of random and/or nonlinear
processes includes knowledge of its past states at several time points; or of
forecasting methods where ensembles of initial conditions are used to best
predict the future state of complex systems, such as the ensemble Kalman
filter [16, 9], or the even less structured particle filters method [19]. All these
methods show a distinct awareness of the relevance of modeling incidental,
historical developmental processes. And we should not forget that many suc-
cessful heuristic methods for optimization are directly inspired to the idea of
fitness landscapes. One example is the field of evolutionary algorithms [8],
modeling optimization of a function as a form of reproduction of solutions,
that allows tentative solutions to the optimization problem to generate new
ones through mutation and genetic crossover, and therefore allowing unex-
pected changes of their fitness, seen as the evaluation of the function to be
optimized at the tentative solution. Another example is particle swarm op-
timization [18], where the search for optimal solutions to a problem is seen
as a collective process in which individual, tentative solutions are changed in
time not only by their tendency to improve their current fitness (in the fit-
ness landscape generated by the function to be optimized), but also by their
tendency to retain close contact with the best known tentative solution.
Still, all these methods work more at the operational level, where model
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classes have already been chosen to solve a certain problem. They do not
constitute, taken individually, a coherent, conceptual shift in the way to
approach historical phenomena, and their complexity. We can try to imag-
ine more radical ways in which such complexity can be tackled by looking
at existing attempts within biology to conceptualize rules of development.
In [22] for example a general “principle of biological inertia” is introduced,
to give a broad conceptual basis to the multiform expression of default dy-
namics in developmental biology. Roughly stated, the principle asserts that,
without external disturbances or internal (genetic) control, there is a “local
self-perpetuation of cell-level dynamics” ([22], page 119). Among the many
embodiments of this principle, in the context of embryo development, bio-
logical inertia would correspond to stating that embryos have a tendency to
reproduce spatially the same basic structure indefinitely. This embodiment
of biological inertia could be seen in the context of historical processes as due
to local optimization functions that tries to maximize replicates, or spatial
distribution, of a basic template. However, in a real system we cannot ex-
pect this inertial behavior of developmental systems to be indefinitely exact
([22], page 123), therefore the local optimization process will break down in
the timeframe of full development and a complex, inhomogeneous organism
may arise.
Note the subtle and nonconventional use of ideas from physics where only
analogy is at work: the principle of biological inertia parallels the principle
of inertia in mechanics, but only at the very general level of establishing
the equivalent for biological systems of a state of rest or dynamical invari-
ance. At the same time, what is essential in the idea of physical inertia is
retained, and its usefulness is seen in the power of conceptualizing the devel-
opmental process itself, rather than in the ability to identify and predict the
final outcome of the process. This logically rigorous and yet informal use of
ideas from mathematics and physics to define principles that partially gov-
ern biological processes might become the standard for a proper structuring
of historical sciences, exactly because individual historical phenomena do
not seem amenable to a compact explanation of their structure, and only
the development that led to their current state may be open to meaning-
ful theorization, a shift advocated by our third methodological motif, the
conceptualization of developmental processes.
Indeed, the theory of evolution could be seen as the archetypical ex-
ample of this motif. Such theory, in itself, is not mathematical, and does
not allow quantitative predictions, but it has its internal logical structure,
and provides a conceptual scaffolding that has inspired biology, and spe-
cific mathematical models, since its inception. As an aside, we believe that
6
our point of view is in line with the recent commentary by Wilson [33], who
suggested that profound ideas in science need not to be mathematically pro-
found; in this perspective, mathematization is an overflow of the richness
and potential of an idea, not a condition of its power.
What is crucial for historical sciences is that the conceptualization of a
developmental process may not even lead to a structural, full understanding
of the state of the resulting phenomenon. The phenomenon may forever re-
main hidden to our understanding, and the microarray paradigm will stand
as the only way to find quantitative answers to most problems we will ask
about it. Conceptualization, at best, can provide the ground, the language,
on which to develop data-driven, agnostic methods to solve problems. This
acknowledgment does not hinder however the tremendous potential of find-
ing ways to use mathematical structures to solve problems about historical
phenomena.
To reflect on this potential, it may be useful to change our focus. Up
to now our discourse moved from the microarray paradigm to an attempt
to characterize the types of phenomena that most likely will require its
application. But we could also reverse this viewpoint, taking for granted
the applicability of the microarray paradigm (i.e. that we have enough
data), and trying to understand, operationally, how to apply it.
One way to do that is of course to give free rein to statistical learning,
data-driven techniques. But here we want to discuss a more general organi-
zational motif: the principle of forcing1, which we introduced in [23]. In that
paper, we suggested that several disparate techniques developed to apply
sophisticated mathematics to empirical problems can be brought together
under a common methodological viewpoint, the idea of forcing mathemat-
ical ideas and methods on the data. More precisely, by forcing we mean
the application to a problem of powerful techniques — such as multiscale
methods as applied to image processing and numerical solutions of differen-
tial equations ([5, 6]), continuity and functional data analysis as applied to
regularization and statistical analysis [26, 27], or topological graph analysis
as applied to classification of molecular structures [3]— not on the basis of a
previous evaluation that these techniques fit with the relevant phenomenon
because of its specific nature, but rather on the basis of a priori confidence in
the power and flexibility of these techniques [23], and using the large amount
of available measurements to adapt the technique to the phenomenon. This
1We named this principle ‘forcing’ in [23] because this term is strongly evocative of the
general methodological approaches it pertains to. It has however no significant relation
to the method introduced by Paul Cohen, now of common use in set theory, that goes by
the same name.
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is an approach that contrasts with the usual idealization process in modeling,
where there is a progressive stripping away of details from the phenomenon,
to reach a simplified image of the same, eventually amenable to analytical
treatment by a mathematical technique (whose usefulness is often suggested
by the idealization process itself).
The example of functional data analysis is perhaps the simplest instance
of forcing, and the most telling: a phenomenon may be discrete, and yet,
if there is enough data (microarray paradigm) we can force regularization
to be able to treat the data as if they were continuous or even smooth, and
therefore access the full machinery of analysis. A more recent example of
forcing, along the same general trust of functional data analysis, is diffusion
geometry [7, 29]. The organizational principle of this theory can be seen, at
a very general level, as the belief that, regardless of the whether the data
available in the empirical problem are categorical, and/or discrete, it is useful
to define a notion of geometrical manifold associated to the data, because
in this way the whole apparatus of functional analysis on manifolds can be
adapted and used to solve the problem itself. For example, the review [7]
describes how scientific journals can be seen as points on a low dimensional
manifold, built by first associating each article to a vector of the frequencies
of preselected words in the article itself, and then by projecting the cloud of
points associated to the whole set of articles onto the directions of maximal
variance. We refer to [23, 7] and to the relevant primary literature [29] for
more details.
To be sure, forcing may be viewed as a coarse and willful attempt to use
mathematics for specific purpose, but are there limits to the applicability of
forcing? Is it plausible to think that, for sufficiently large and diverse data
sets, any mathematical structure can be forced on them in a computationally
efficient way to solve problems?
While we do not have answers to these questions, the weakening of the
relation between individual models and phenomena should make us think
more deeply about the role of mathematics in science. We suggested above
that historical phenomena may not be amenable to uniform, structured re-
duction to simple models, and in these cases a data analysis approach to
each problem instance is most likely the best that can be expected when
approaching them, whether by forcing, or by standard statistical learning
and classification techniques. And these data-driven applications of math-
ematics lead us to an intriguing version of the famous question of Wigner
about the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics: how can classification
methods, which are essentially function fitting on data, be so successful at
predicting phenomena?
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Our suggestion is that the four methodological motifs we highlighted
may give us a context for asking such questions and for a comprehensive
reflection on the ways modern science is so effective at problem solving. We
are also encouraged by the interdependence of the motifs: the notion of
historical phenomena, and the principle of forcing seem pertinent only in
the context of large data sets, and therefore are deeply dependent on the
microarray paradigm; and defining historical phenomena naturally shifts
the emphasis from phenomena’s states to the developmental processes that
generate them.
Surely science may have become agnostic, and data analysis methods
are often incapable of providing understanding of phenomena, they only
give answers to our problems. But this does not imply that its methods
should not be amenable to understanding. On the contrary, it is exactly
the absence of understanding of phenomena that brings urgency to a widely
shared methodological and epistemological reflection of the scientific com-
munity. Mathematics may not work necessarily for historical sciences the
way it did for physics, but that does not mean that it has to reduce itself to
blind computations, and principles such as biological inertia show that it is
possible to gain deep insight into the rules of this historical development.
And therefore this is, in the end, an invitation to mathematicians, to
approach biology and other historical sciences on their own terms, a process
that frustrates superficial knowledge of each field, and challenges us, if we
want to be relevant, not so much to be interdisciplinary, as to be scientifically
bilingual. We may discover that what is essential in a field, and the true
linchpin of its conceptualization, is often very different from what we deem
profound or interesting in our own mathematical disciplines.
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